Why Lucas is not a Hayekian by Zijp, R.van
SERIE RESEARCH mEmORIMDn 
WHY IS LUCAS NOT A HAYEKIAN 
by R.W» van Zijp 
Research Memorandum 1990-27 
June 1990 
VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT 
FACULTEIT DER ECONOMISCHE WETENSCHAPPEN 
EN ECONOMETRIE 
A M S T E R D A M 

Why Lucas is not a Hayekian 
by R.W. van Zijp 
1. Introduction 
In an attempt to clarify their own work economists frequently refer to supposed predecessors. 
These references often facilitate interpretation, thereby placing the referring economist in a 
research tradition. However, the interpretation will only be helpful if it is 'correct'. 
Recently economists have debated the issue whether the New Classical Macroeconomics and the 
revived (Neo-)Austrian School share the same roots. This idea was launched by Robert Lucas, a 
leading New Classical, who claimed that New Classicism embroiders on the work on business 
cycle theory accomplished during the 1920s and 1930s by one of the leading Austrians of those 
days, Friedrich A. von Hayek. In the subsequent literature this claim has more or less been 
confïrmed (cf. Kantor (1979), Colander and Guthrie (1980); Laidler (1982); Scheide (1982)). 
Conversely, Butos (1986, p. 341) thinks that the claim is correct but misleading. He says that 
Hayek increasingly acknowledged the lirnitations of general-equilibrium analysis whereas New 
Classicals strongly favor this form of analysis. He argues that Lucas disregards the possibility 
that Hayek might have treated general equilibrium merely as a starting point, whereas New 
Classicals see it as the ultimate form of analysis (Butos (1986, p. 342)). 
This paper will argue that Hayek had in his early works (i.e. during the 1920s and 1930s) 
already developed the nucleus of his ideas concerning the proper ways of analyzing business 
cycles. Furthermore, it will also be shown that his research programme (i.e. the sequence of 
problem-situations to be solved) differed substantially from that of the New Classicals. It will be 
argued that Hayek and Lucas pursue different goals. 
The analysis will be limited to those aspects of Hayek's analysis, which are closely interrelated, 
namely (1) the interaction between individuals, (2) the level of aggregation, (3) the role of 
'Knightean' uncertainty, and (4) the 'objectivity' of the underlying economie model. Section 2 
studies Hayek's work on business cycle theory of the 1920s and 1930s, whilst that of Lucas is 
analyzed in section 3. In section 4 the differences between the views of both economists will be 
analyzed. Section 5 will explain these differences in terms of the respective goals Hayek and 
Lucas pursued. The paper ends with some conclusions and final remarks. 
This paper is a translated and extended edition of my article 'Hayek and Lucas: een 
vergelijking', Maandschrift Economie 54 (1990), pp. 128 - 39. It is to be presented at the ISINI 
Congress, Paris, August 27 - 29, 1990. 
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2. Hayek: the coordination problem 
2.1. Equilibrium in Havek's analvsis 
Hayek's main works on business cycle theory are Prices and Production (1931) and Geldtheorie 
und Konjunkturtheorie (1929, English translation Monetarv Theory and the Trade Cvcle. 1933), 
supplemented in 1939 by the bundie of essays Profïts. Interest and Investment. Notably in the 
second book Hayek (1933, p. 42n) explicitly stated that his business cycle theory must be placed 
in a Walrasian general equilibrium framework. Such framework implies that business cycles can 
only be caused by exogenous disturbances, for if they are caused endogenously, one cannot 
maintain that a Walrasian (static) equilibrium already existed. Furthermore, the framework poses 
a problem: does the economy not react to an exogenous disturbance by forming a new 
equilibrium (if the equihbrium is a stable one) or by moving away from it (if it is unstable)? In 
other words, it is impossible to explain recurring cyclical movements endogenously in a 
Walrasian general equilibrium framework which at best can only analyze the formation of a new 
equilibrium, that is, which must make use of the 'logic' of equilibrium theory (Hayek (1933, pp. 
42 - 43)). 
In order to render such explanation possible Hayek had to expand his Walrasian framework. As 
a pupil of Ludwig von Mises he regarded money as causing the contradiction between general 
equilibrium and business cycles. Walrasian equihbrium theory had traditionally treated money as 
just another good. Furthermore, it held that all prices are determined simultaneously by an 
instantaneous tatonnement process, which implies the absence of time. Hayek (1928 (1984), p. 
72) argued that this was a misconception, in the sense that the existence of money implies time 
because it allows for the allocation of expenditures in time. In order to overcome this problem 
Hayek (1928 (1984), p. 76) created a concept of intertemporal equilibrium, in which "... the 
relations between the particular decisions of the economie subjects, and thus between all the 
economie processes conducted within the overall time period, must always be basically the same 
as those which can be derived for an equilibrium system in which time has been assumed away". 
As economie decisions are based on expectations and (more fundamentally) knowledge, the 
knowledge of the actors in a Hayekian equilibrium situation must be identical to that of the 
actors (or auctioneer) in Walrasian equihbrium. This means that Hayekian intertemporal general 
equilibrium implies that (1) preferences and means of production at each moment in time are 
known to the individuals when they are planning their actions for the next period, and (2) all 
goods may be used to satisfy needs at each moment in time (1928 (1984), p. 76 note 6 (p. 114)). 
In short, Hayek's business cycle theory must be placed in an 'dynamic' general-equilibrium 
framework, which incorporates time. This is done by treating money as not just another good, 
but instead as a means to allocate expenditures intertemporally (i.e. as a store of value). 
Alternative, non-equilibrium, modes of explanation are heavily criticized by Hayek (1929, 1933). 
However, these criticisms do not indicate how one can explain business cycles in terms of 
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general-equilibrium analysis. Such an explanation is possible only if general equilibrium is 
disturbed. However, such disturbance is not allowed to conflict with the individuals' rationality. 
The individual is assumed to be a rational agent (which means that he will act to the best of his 
ability, given his knowledge). Thus Hayek discerns between individual and general equili-brium, 
that is between optimality for the individual and optimality for the economy as a whole (Butos 
(1986, p. 334)). This distinction will prove to be essential in Hayek's business cycle theory. 
2.2. Individual and general equilibrium: the coordination problem 
According to the Hayek, the actions of individuals are based on their plans. Individuals are said 
to be in equilibrium when they cannot improve their actions, given their knowledge. Thus, in 
equilibrium individual actions are optimal (with regard to the plan upon which they are based). 
This optimality is called individual equilibrium. On the other hand, one cannot discern a general 
plan for society as a whole. Therefore, general equilibrium must refer to the individual plans, or 
rather, to the multitude of individual equilibria. Individuals are supposed to be in equilibrium if 
they had no incentive to change their actions. This will be so, Hayek argued, if their plans are 
fulfïlled. But plans will only be fulfilled if the expectations on which the actions are based, are 
correct. And these expectations must in turn be formed on the basis of correct, that is perfect 
knowledge and foresight. In Hayek's terms, individual equilibrium exists if and only if 'the 
subjective data' (that is, objective reality as known by the individuals) is identical to the 
'objective data' (that is, 'objective reality' or the model as known to or presupposed by the 
observer/scientist) (Hayek (1937, pp. 36 - 39)). 
General equilibrium is more difficult to defme because of the multitude of (conflicting) plans it 
comprises. This multitude leads to the problem of conflicting plans. What if plans are not 
consistent in the sense that the fulfilment of his plan by individual A prohibits individual B from 
fulfilling his? Do we define such a situation as 'general equilibrium'? If so, then all situations 
may be termed general equilibrium, which renders the concept meaningless. Instead, Hayek 
(1937, p. 38) defined the concept as the situation in which all individuals are in individual 
equilibrium and in which their plans do not conflict (that is, the situation in which all plans are 
interpersonally consistent). The first property of general equilibrium means that individuals act to 
the best of their ability, given their knowledge. Furthermore, it implies that all plans must come 
true. This means that the individuals must have perfect knowledge, including perfect foresight. 
Then they know (1) the 'true' structure of the model, (2) all plans and actions of the other 
individuals, and (3) the values of all exogenous variables. 
In other words, the Hayekian dynamic general equilibrium construct implies that it will be 
Later, Hayek would call an economie subject an 'economy', characterized by its unequivo-
cal ordering of preferences. The economy as a whole would be termed 'catallaxy', being a set of 
'economies'. A 'catallaxy' does not have one unambiguous ordering of preferences; rather, it is 
characterized by the fact that it contains many such orderings which are often conflicting. 
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 Butos (1986, p. 334). 
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maintained if no unexpected changes occur. Expectations are fundamental to Hayek's equilibrium 
construct. Moreover, the defining characteristic that all plans must come true imphes that none 
of the plans may be inconsistent in the sense that the fulfülment of the one inevitably leads to 
the failure fulfiUing another. In other words, plans cannot be interpersonally inconsistent in 
Hayekian general equilibrium; the coordination problem is solved.4 In contrast, disequilibrium 
imphes that this problem does exist: some individuals' plans are frustrated. These individuals will 
face unexpected consequences of their actions and will have to adapt their actions in order to 
avoid further frustrations in" future periods. This brings us to the intertemporal characteristics of 
Hayek's equilibrium concept. 
2.3. Intertemporal equilibrium 
Suppose that at the end of period 1 individual A changes his preferences, and that all other data 
remain unchanged. If all other individuals (say B and C) recognize this change immediately (that 
is, before period 2 has begun and they already have acted), they will change their actions 
(relative to those in period 1). If individual A's new actions already anticipate the new actions of 
B and C, none of the three individuals will be disappointed.6 General dynamic equilibrium in 
the Hayekian sense thus imphes that individuals must have perfect foresight, because they would 
otherwise be confronted with unexpected circumstances, leading to the frustration of their plans.7 
Hayek's general dynamic equilibrium concept implies that all individuals act optimally, and that 
the changes in their actions are optimal as well. A precondition then is that all individuals know 
how to change their actions. Perfect knowledge and perfect foresight therefore are defining 
characteristics of the Hayekian general dynamic equilibrium. If there are no unexpected 
(endogenous or exogenous) changes, general equilibrium is maintained. As Hayek (1937, p. 42) 
concluded, "[i]t appears that the concept of equilibrium merely means that the foresight of the 
different members of the society is in a special sense correct. It must be correct in the sense 
that every person's plan is based on the expectation of just those actions of other people which 
those other people intend to perform and that all these plans are based on the expectation of 
the same set of external facts, so that under certain conditions nobody will have any reason to 
change his plans. Correct foresight is then not, as it has sometimes been understood, a 
precondition which must exist in order that equilibrium may be arrived at. It is rather the 
4
 O'Driscoll (1977, pp. 26 - 28). 
Notice that unexpected consequences of actions is not a synonym for unintended 
consequences. Unexpected consequences may be intended, and unintended consequences may be 
expected. 
If A did not anticipate the change in actions of B and C, he will be disappointed in 
period 2. He will then start the process of revising actions all over again. 
7
 Hayek, 1933c (1939), pp. 139 - 41. Hayek elaborated the relation between equilibrium and 
knowledge further in his 1937-article 'Economics and Knowledge'. 
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defining characteristic of a state of equilibrium." 
According to Hayek (1937, p. 35), the concept of general equilibrium must be regarded as an 
instrument of formal, tautological analysis, that is as a 'pure logic of choice'. This formal analysis 
may be rendered empirically meaningful by adding "... definite statements about how knowledge 
is acquired and communicated" (Hayek (1937, p. 33)). These empirical statements will determine 
whether a tendency towards general equilibrium exists. That is, whether the 'subjective data' 
tends to become identical to the 'objective data'. If so, a tendency towards the solution of the 
coordination problem exists as well. 
2.4. The business cvcle as a disequilibrium phenomenon 
It may be possible that the plans and actions of the individuals are discoordinated. In this 
situation knowledge cannot be perfect, for if it were, nobody's plans would have been frustrated. 
Hayek considers knowledge to be dispersed among all the individuals. This means that the 
economy will not be in general equilibrium. He interprets the business cycle as a discoordi-
nation (and therefore disequilibrium) phenomenon in which individuals are confronted with 
unexpected outcomes of their actions. 
During a business cycle the individuals are faced with unexpected outcomes. That is, they make 
expectational errors. But more importantly, they do not make these errors at random. Empirical 
evidence shows that these errors are similar across the various markets. This means that many 
individuals make similar mistakes. Hayek (1933c (1939, p. 141) acknowledges that his task is to 
explain why individuals make expectational errors and, moreover, why different individuals, and 
more specifically entrepreneurs, make similar mistakes. He discerns two reasons why this must 
be so. The first reason is an exogenous one and refers to some psychological state of mind (e.g. 
Pareto's 'waves of optimism or pessimism' or Keynes's 'animal spirits'). The second reason, 
which Hayek considers to be more likely, is that the entrepreneurs are misled by following 
guidelines and signals which generally have proved reliable. One of these guidelines (and 
presumably the most important one in market economies) is the price system: "... it may be that 
the prices existing when they [i.e., the entrepreneurs] made their decisions and on which they 
had to base their views about the future have created expectations which must necessarily be 
disappointed" (Hayek (1933c (1939), p. 141)). Prices (including the market rate of interest) on 
which entrepreneurs base their actions may be distorted. This causes expectational errors on the 
part of the entrepreneurs, which leads to the creation of a business cycle. The question then is 
what causes the distortion of the relative price structure. 
Before expounding Hayek's business cycle theory, it must be noted that Hayek implicitly views 
each individual as a unique person with a unique ordering of preferences. This means that each 
person will demand a unique basket of goods, which differs from the basket demanded by other 
individuals. This will prove to be essential in Hayek's business cycle theory. 
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According to Hayek, business cycles are caused by credit expansion. In this sense his theory is a 
monetary theory. The extra amount of money created by this expansion must enter the economy 
at a specific point because it cannot be spread out proportionally and immediately over all 
individuals. As a result, some individuals will receive it sooner than others. They will raise their 
demand for goods, which leads to the disturbance of relative prices: the prices of the goods 
demanded will rise increasingly. This implies that real wages (in terms of the goods produced by 
the labourers in question) will fall. The rise in prices also means that entrepreneurs will base 
their investment decisions on disequilibrium prices. They will invest in projects which seem to be 
profitable but which will appear to be unprofitable in due time: the structure ('Aufbau') of 
pröduction is disturbed. From this effect the term 'malinvestment theory" has been derived. 
There is another effect caused by the credit expansion. The increase in the supply of money will 
lead to excess supply on the money market. This leads to a fall in the real rate of interest below 
the long-run equilibrium level. The latter is also called the 'natural rate of interest', with 
reference to Wicksell (1898, pp. 93 - 94). The fall in real interest rate will make investment in 
capital intensive methods of production more profitable, spreading the boom to the investment 
goods industries. Sooner or later the boom increases the demand for means of production. Real 
wages and real interest rates must then rise. In Hayek's view this will happen in such a way as 
to restore the original relationship between the real interest rate and the real wage rate. The 
new capital-intensive investments are then seen to be unprofitable. The economy must 'recover' 
by eliminating the malinvestments. During this recovery process credit fiows back to the private 
banks, which will lend them again in due time, thereby creating a new boom. 
Fundamental to Hayek's (1931, p. 11) analysis is "... the point where the additional money is 
injected into circulation (or where the money is withdrawn from circulation)...." Hayek (1931, pp. 
3 - 5 ) severely criticized Irving Fisher's quantity theory of money because it only analyzed the 
influence money has on the general price level. Monetary influences may have real conse-
quences, even if the general price level does not change. In that case relative prices change, 
thereby altering the composition of the aggregates while leaving their magnitude unchanged. The 
changing composition implies that different individuals will experience different influences, which 
in turn evoke changes in individual knowledge, expectations, plans and actions. These changes 
disturb the general equilibrium. The interactions between the actions of individuals will then 
start to play a major role in any equilibrating process. 
In sum, the basic features of Hayek's business cycle theory for our purposes are (1) his concept 
of 'the individual' as a unique human being, (2) the role of money as causing the business cycle, 
(3) the disturbance of the structure of production as the real phenomenon constituting the cycle, 
and (4) his desaggregated level of analysis in which the composition of aggregates is seen as 
more important than their magnitude. 
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2.5. Criticism on Hayek's analvsis 
Hayek's analysis may be criticized on at least two accounts. Firstly, Hayek presupposes an 
objective reality which is independent of the individuals' subjective perceptions. For Hayek the 
problem was how the subjective data would converge to this objective reahty. Caldwell (1988, p. 
529) argued that the objective reality is not independent from the subjective perceptions. The 
actions of the individuals depend on their subjective perceptions of reality. Furthermore, their 
actions influence the objective reality. If their subjective perceptions change, their actions and 
therefore objective reality will also change. This will seriously hamper any equilibrating process. 
Secondly, the existence of the coordination problem need not imply chaos. It seems that Hayek 
equates 'order' in any economy with the existence of (or tendency towards) equilibrium. High 
(1986) claimed that the market process may be seen as an order, whereas at the same time it 
implies the absence of coordination. It is an order in the sense that equilibrating forces tend to 
offset disturbing forces. This approach has the advantage that the individuals' end-means-
framework need not be considered exogenously given. It may change during the process, not 
leading towards equilibrium but maintaining a disequilibrium order. Moreover, the existence of 
the coordination problem may be seen as a driving force behind the market process. The 
constant frustration of their plans may provide the individuals with the incentive to seareh for 
new opportunities to improve their expected future circumstances. It may lead to a competition 
process in which resources are used more efficiently. 
3. Lucas: disregarding coordination 
3.1. Introduction 
Robert Lucas is one of the founders of New Classicism. This school of thought arose from 
Monetarism and may be considered as a Walrasian equivalent on Marshallian monetarism, 
because it employs general equilibrium analysis.8 Not only did it substitute partial-equilibrium 
analysis by general-equilibrium analysis, it also replaced Cagan's (1956) Adaptive Expectations 
Hypothesis by Muth's (1961) Rational Expectations Hypothesis (REH). This eliminated the 
inconsistency between the process of forming expectations adaptively and the rationality 
postulate.9 Furthermore, New Classicism revived interest in business cycle theory. 
3.2. Lucas's intertemporal equilibrium 
In the late 1950s and in the 1960s most economists became increasingly convinced that the 
relationship between the rate of inflation and the unemployment rate as found by Phillips (1958) 
ö
 Cf. Hoover (1984). 
9
 Adaptive expectations are based on the past values of the variable which must be 
predicted. All other available and relevant information is not used. One might expect that 
rational individuals do use such information. Therefore, the AEH may be seen as inconsistent 
with the rationality postulate. 
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could be regarded as an exploitable tradeoff which governments could use in order to establish 
the desired combinations between inflation and unemployment. In his presidential address to the 
American Economie Association Milton Friedman (1968) stated that the Phillips curve in the 
long run did not constitute such an exploitable tradeoff. He argued that rational individuals do 
not suffer from money illusion, as is implied by the exploitable-tradeoff interpretation of the 
Phillips curve. They will take the price level and the rate of inflation into account in their future 
plans, basing their actions upon the real wage rate. In Friedman's opinion Phillips' analysis "... 
contains a basic defect - the failure to distinguish between nominal wages and real wages ..." 
(Friedman (1968, p. 8, italics in original)). Friedman raised another point of critique against 
Phillips' analysis. He implicitly accused him of confusing the rate of unemployment with the 
changes in this rate. According to Friedman, "... the Phillips curve should relate the rate of 
unemployment to changes in the real not the nominal wage rate, and ... the long-run relationship 
should be between the level of the wage rate and the rate of unemployment and not between 
the changes in the wage rate and the rate of unemployment." Analogous to Wicksell's 'natural' 
rate of interest, Friedman calls this long-run relationship the natural rate of unemployment 
(NRU). The NRU reflects the equilibrium rate of unemployment to which a stable economy 
tends, once disruptive influences have been removed. In this situation no tradeoff exists 
between the rate of unemployment and the change in the nominal wage rate. Individuals then do 
not suffer from money illusion. More importantly, they know whether a given change in a 
particular price is an absolute or a relative one. This implies that they must know all prices: 
when the economy is at its NRU, individuals have perfect knowledge. Lucas (among other New 
Classicals) has adopted the NRU as a long-run perfect knowledge equilibrium. However, this 
equilibrium is not a static one. Rather, it is a dynamic version of Walras's static equilibrium. As 
Colander and Guthrie (1980, p. 226 - 27) have argued, Lucas extends the Walrasian equilibrium 
concept (which holds that all actions are optimal) to an intertemporal framework in which all 
changes in actions are optimal. Lucas's equilibrium may thus be seen as an 'optimal adjustment 
path'. As will be shown, the expectations formation process plays a major role in this regard. 
As Hoover argues, Friedman should not have directed his criticisms towards Phillips' 
analysis but rather to the Standard interpretation of the Phillips curve, as initiated by Samuelson 
and Solow (1960). Cf. Hoover (1988, p. 260, note 6). 
1
 Friedman (1968, p. 8) relates the level of unemployment to the level of real wages. 
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 Hoover (1988, pp. 24 - 25, italics in original). 
Friedman (1968, p. 8) defines the natural rate of unemployment as "... the level that 
would be grounded out by the Walrasian system of general equilibrium equations, provided there 
is embedded in them the actual structural characteristics of the labor and commodity markets, 
including market imperfections, stochastic variability in demands and supplies, the cost of 
gathering information about job vacancies and labor availabilities, the cost of mobility, and so 
on." 
14
 Hoover (1988) p. 25. 
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Apart from the 'natural rate equiUbrium', which is characterized by full information, Lucas 
(1988, p. 1, italics in original) uses another equilibrium concept, namely Rationa! Expectations 
EquiKbrium (REE). The REE is defined as a (Nash) equiUbrium, which "... does not refer to a 
system 'at rest', nor does it necessarily mean 'competitive' equiUbrium in the sense of price 
taking agents, nor does it have in general any connection with social optimaüty properties of any 
kind. All it does mean is that, in the model, the objectives of each agent and the situation he 
faces are made expUcit, that each agent is doing the best he can in Ught of the actions taken by 
others, and that these actions taken together are technologically feasible." This means that Lucas 
assumed that individuals always optimize successfuUy, given their knowledge. Therefore, the REE 
is always maintained. However, it does not mean that this equiUbrium is stable, or that 
individuals have perfect knowledge. As Lucas already stated in the quotation given above, the 
system need not be at rest. It even allows for quite large fluctuations in real variables, e.g. 
during business cycles. 
Obviously, the REE differs from the 'natural rate equiUbrium'. The main difference between 
both concepts is that the latter presupposes fuU information (complete knowledge) while the 
former does not. Both concepts differ due to different assumptions with regard to the indivi-
dual's information set. 
In order to justify the REE New Classicals have analyzed whether it exists in the 'real world'. 
Or to put it differently (and more correctly) they have analyzed whether the concept may be 
used to interpret 'real-world' phenomena. It ües beyond the scope of this paper to analyze this 
problem extensively. All that may be said on the subject is that the results of these studies are 
rather ambiguous. 
3.3. Continuous market clearing 
In Lucas's benchmark-world markets are seen as continuously clearing. Nominal wages and 
prices are then perfectly flexible, equating demand and supply instantaneously and leaving no 
room for involuntary unemployment. This may seem inconsistent with factual evidence. 
Keynesians argue that nominal wages and prices are not perfectly flexible. Rather, they exhibit 
downward rigidity. Keynesians hold that economie theory must therefore take such rigidity into 
account. In contrast, the New Classicals oppose this position vehemently. Lucas and Sargent 
(1978, p. 305) argued that "... Keynes took as an unexamined postulate that money wages are 
sticky, meaning that they are set at a level or by a process that could be taken as üninfluenced 
by the macroeconomic forces he proposed to analyze." In their opinion, Keynes did not explain 
For an analysis concerning the existence of the REE, see e.g. Shiller (1978) and Bray 
(1983). 
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such stickiness. As they loathe 'ad-hocness', New Classicals try to supply such an explanation. 
In doing so they must obviously start from the assumption that nominal wages and prices are 
completely flexible. This means, of course, that all markets must continuously be in equili-
brium. If this is the case, general equilibrium will always exist. This equilibrium may be a REE 
or a NRU equilibrium, depending on the information set assumed. 
3.4. The Lucas supply function 
The Natural Rate Hypothesis (NRH) holds that a level of supply and employment exists at 
which the rate of change in prices remains constant. It implies that individuals' expectations are 
correct, which is only possible if their knowledge is correct. In this sense Lucas's benchmark 
may be identified as the equilibrium situation in which output and employment are at their 
respective natural rates, which are established when all individuals have complete knowledge. 
The benchmark is dynamic in the sense that real variables remain at their 'natural' rate as long 
as all (exogenous and endogenous) changes are perceived and their effects are correctly 
anticipated. 
This starting point seems to be contradicted by the Phillips curve. Therefore, Lucas must 
incorporate one or more features which render the explanation of this curve possible. He found 
this explanation in the difference between the actual and expected real rates of return.18 
Informational errors cause divergences from the 'natural rate'. This may be shown mathematical-
ly by the so-called 'Lucas supply function': 
One might argue that contract theory provides a new rationale for nominal wage and 
price rigidity. Lucas (1988, pp. 93 - 95, italics in original) argues that this idea "... is similar to 
the older idea that monopoüstic elements can play the same theoretical role. The underlying 
idea is the not-unreasonable one that since money can often be shown in competitive theoretical 
models to possess neutrality properties that do not seem to obtain in reality, replacing the 
assumption of competition with some other assumed form of interaction will yield theories that 
are closer to reality with respect to their predictions about money and prices." However, this 
underlying idea "... overlooks the triviality of the Standard monetary neutrality theorems, and 
hence of their insensitivity to the nature of the equilibrium being studied." In Lucas's opinion 
"[t]he central issue for a theory of nominal price rigidity ... is not the nature of the game agents 
are assumed to be engaged in, but rather the information agents are assumed to have about the 
state of the system at each date." 
Explaining wage and price rigidity by a theory which already assumes these rigidities 
resembles pulling oneself up by one's own bootstraps. 
18
 Most New Classicals, notably Lucas (1973, 1975), Sargent and Wallace (1973) and Barro 
(1976), have used the price as the variable about which expectations must be formed. But as 
Barro (1980) has shown, using the real rate of return enables the NCE to incorporate various 
(interest-bearing) assets into its analysis, thereby making its analysis more general. Cf. also 
Lucas and Rapping (1969), McCallum (1978), King (1980). 
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 See e.g. Lucas and Rapping (1969, p. 21 - 22); Lucas (1972b, p. 93); Sargent (1973 
(1981), p. 163). As Shiller (1978, p. 9) observes, the Lucas supply function is a representation of 
the Phillips Curve if there is a linear relationship between the measure of aggregated output and 
the unemployment rate. 
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y = z + a (1-6) (rn - re) 
in which y = aggregated level of real output; 
z = 'natural rate' of output; 
rn = 'natural' rate of return; 
re = expected real rate of return; 
a = parameter, indicating the extent in which a deviation of the expected real rate of 
return from the actual rate influences the actual level of aggregated output; 
B = parameter, indicating that the higher the changes in real rate of return the lower 
output deviates from its natural rate. 
The Lucas supply function indicates that the real value of aggregated output depends on the 
natural rate of output and on the difference between real and expected rate of return. In 
other words, it states that general equilibrium exists if individuals do not make expectational 
errors, that is if re = in (assuming that output initially is on its natural rate, i.e. that the system 
initially is in equilibrium). The deviation of output from its natural rate will be smaller if 
changes in the real rate of return are higher (if 8 is higher). This property may be attributed to 
the assumption that if these changes are larger, individuals will be more inclined to attribute a 
larger proportion of a given change in the rate of return on their local market to a change in 
the economy-wide rate of return. 
3.5. Rationa! Expectations Hypothesis 
Lucas acknowledges that individuals do not possess perfect knowledge and perfect foresight. 
They must form expectations in order to be able to make plans. As knowledge is imperfect, 
these expectations may be wrong. But although they may be wrong, they are not adaptive. 
Adaptive expectations incorporate only the past values of the variable which has to be predicted. 
Lucas argues that this may not be rational. Individuals will also make use of other information 
they possess. Furthermore, adaptive expectations allow the government and monetary authorities 
to keep unemployment constantly below the NRU if they were to expand the money supply 
increasingly. Lucas argues that systematic expectational mistakes are easily corrected; therefore 
individuals will take the accelerating money expansion into account. They will use all the relevant 
knowledge available. In particular, they will use the knowledge they have on the government's 
policy. They do not form their expectations adaptively but, rather, 'rationally'. As adaptive 
expectations do not rule out the possibility of systematically biased expectations, they "... permit 
both short- and long-run Phillips-like trade-offs between inflation and real output" (Lucas (1972b, 
p. 95)). Therefore, Lucas substitutes the Rational Expectations Hypothesis for the Adaptive 
Expectations Hypothesis. 
Rational expectations had already been used by John Muth (1961). He advanced the hypothesis 
Sargent (1973, pp. 442 - 44). 
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that expectations are essentially the same as the predictions of the relevant economie theory 
(Muth (1961, p. 315)). Or, as he formulated more exactly, "... expectations of firms (or, more 
generally, the subjective probability distributions of outcomes) tend to be distributed, for the 
same information set, about the prediction of the theory (or the 'objective' probability distribu-
tions of outcomes)" (Muth (1961, p. 316)). However, for purposes of analysis Muth (1961, p. 
317) used a 'specialized form' of the REH in a partial-equilibrium analysis, in which he assumed 
that the random disturbances are normally distributed. Lucas also uses this form of the REH, 
but whereas Muth had applied the hypothesis to a partial-equilibrium situation, Lucas used it in 
a general-equilibrium framework. Unfortunately, Muth's (and Lucas's) formulation leaves room 
for at least four interpretations. A taxonomy may be formulated which discerns a strong and a 
weak form of the REH. The former may be divided in three versions.21 It will lead us to far 
astray to go into all versions. Our analysis will be limited to the weak and the strong form. 
The strong form of the Rational Expectations Hypothesis (REH) holds that expectations are 
formed on the basis of all potentially relevant information concerning the structure of the 
economy as well as the past and current data. Moreover, it holds that this information is used 
in such a way that all expectations are correct. The strong form may be formulated on a micro-
or a macro-level. The former holds that individuals form correct expectations. The latter states 
that in the aggregate expectations are correct. This means that individuals may make expecta-
tional errors, but that these errors cancel each other out. Haltiwanger and Waldman (1989) have 
shown that the distinction between the micro- and the macro-type versions of the REH is 
important because both versions may yield rather different equilibria. They conclude that "[o]nly 
under very special conditions do Standard [i.e. micro-type] rational expectations and aggregate 
rational expectations yield equivalent results. The difference between the two equilibria is larger 
when: (i) the divergence in expectations under aggregate rational expectations is increased; (ii) in 
a world which exhibits congestion, the severity of the congestion is decreased; (iii) in a world 
which exhibits synergism, the severity of the synergism is increased; and (iv) the activities exhibit 
synergism rather than congestion" (Haltiwanger and Waldman (1989, p. 621)). These results 
incorporate the effects of an individual's behaviour on the outcome of the actions of other 
individuals. By contrast, Lucas seems to equate the micro-REH with the macro-REH. This 
means that he neglects the interactional effects. As will be shown in section 3.6, this is due to 
his use of the concept of the 'representative agent'. 
The weak form of the REH is merely a restatement of the rationality postulate. Individuals are 
assumed to optimize the information on which they base their decisions. Obviously, the optima! 
information need not be sufficiënt to allow for correct expectations. Furthermore, it may not 
even be possible to determine the optimal amount of information to be gathered. Information 
Fischer (1980), Gomes (1982) and Snippe (1986) have formulated such taxonomies. 
2 2
 Grossman (1980, p. 10); Snippe (1986-87, p. 428). 
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optimization presupposes expectations on the marginal return and cost of the information. On 
the other hand, expectations, being informed predictions, presuppose information. In other 
words, expectations are needed in order to optimize information, while information is needed to 
form expectations. This may appear to be a problem of circularity, but it is not. It is a problem 
of infinite regress because the information needed for expectations formation is of a different 
kind than the information for which the expectations are needed. Thus, optimizing information 
involves an infinite regress, which renders the weak form of the REH a highly unsatisfactory 
representation of the individual's information gathering process. 
As will be clear, individuals will only attain the full information (natural rate) equilibrium if they 
use some version of the strong form of the REH. That is, if they have correct expectations and 
thus perfect foresight and perfect knowledge. This will only be rational if the information can be 
acquired without incurring costs (Darby, 1976). This is a highly unrealistic assumption, as is 
shown by explicating the information needed to form correct expectations. This information must 
incorporate (1) the 'true' structure of the (model) economy, (2) the 'true' values of the 
parameters in that economy, (3) all relevant past values of the relevant variables, and (4) all 
exogenous shocks which the economy will undergo during the period under consideration. 
However, as will be shown later, this lack of realism is not inconsistent with Lucas's views on 
the goals which economics must achieve as a science. 
The REH plays an extremely important role in the adjustment process of the individuals' 
actions. According to Colander and Guthrie (1980, pp. 226 - 27), "[t]he REH merely extends the 
Pareto optimality argument to an intertemporal framework: ... [w]ith this assumption, it is 
intuitively reasonable that a dynamic counterpart to Pareto optimality will be the optimal 
dynamic adjustment hypothesis: economie agents are optimally adjusting to revealed information 
and, subject to certain second-order conditions, the economy will be on the optimal adjustment 
path" (cf. section 3.2). 
3.6. The Cournot problem 
Hayek's analysis of cyclical fluctuations centered on the interrelations between the actions of 
individuals. He starts his business cycle theory from the position that a multitude of individuals 
exist. This means that he cannot model the economy as he sees it. As Cournot (1838 (1927), p. 
127) already observed, "... in reality the economie system is a whole of which all the parts are 
interconnected and react on each other. ... It seems, therefore, as if, for a complete and rigorous 
solution of the problems relative to some parts of the economie system, it were indispensable to 
take the entire system into consideration. But this would surpass the powers of mathematical 
analysis and of our practical methods of calculation, even if the values of all the constants could 
be assigned to them numerically." One and a half century later, the powers of mathematics, or 
rather of the human mind, are still insufficiënt to solve this 'Cournot problem' of modelling the 
behaviour of all individuals and their interrelations (cf. Hoover (1988, pp. 135, 220)). Moreover, 
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there are hardly any constants in economics. 
In order to model economie activity some abstractions must be made. Lucas (1972a, 1974, 1988) 
'solves' the Cournot problem by introducing one or a few 'representative individuals' (defmed by 
their respective utiüty functions), thus abstracting from the multitude of individuals. In fact, he 
seems to treat aggregates and index numbers as if they obey the principles of microeconomics 
(cf. Hoover (1988, p. 242)). But it would appear that this solution to the Cournot problem is not 
really a solution, because it circumvents the problem. The number of individuals is limited. But 
the problem was posed by the number of individuals and goods. In other words, Lucas does not 
solve the problem; he bypasses it as irrelevant. This means that he cannot study the coordina-
tion problem. The use of the concept of the 'representative individual' indicates that Hayek and 
Lucas do not try to solve the same problem. In section 5 this pcint will be elaborated. 
3.7. Lucas's business cvcle theory 
Lucas's (1972a) business cycle theory starts from Phelps's island parable. The problem Lucas 
faced was how to model the individuals' short-run imperfect information. This problem had 
already been solved by Phelps (1967). Not surprisingly, Lucas adopted Phelps's solution. Phelps 
depicted an economy as a set of islands. Each island represents a labour market. Furthermore, 
each individual lives on an island of which he possesses all current information. Phelps assumed 
that information about wages offered on other islands travels slowly. These assumptions amount 
to an information set of the individual, in which all current local information is included and 
which contains only lagged (and therefore incomplete) global information. Absence of money 
illusion implies that individuals must form expectations on. real variables. In Phelps's 'island 
parable' they must do so with incomplete short-run global information. They are then faced with 
an interpretation problem, namely whether a rise in their local nominal wage is caused by a rise 
in their real wage or in the general price level. The incomplete information on which the 
expectations are based, will lead some (or many) individuals to form incorrect interpretations. 
This means that these individuals respond to nominal changes as if they were real changes. It 
seems that they suffer from money illusion, while in fact they merely interpret the change in 
nominal wage wrongly because of lacking information. 
In Lucas's business cycle model individuals make identical mistakes. Suppose that the monetary 
authorities expand the money supply unexpectedly. According to the quantity theory of money, 
this will lead to a rise in the general price level. This means that individuals are confronted with 
an increase in their local price. Some individuals will interpret this increase incorrectly. They will 
expand production. However, the next period the additional global information becomes 
available. Individuals then realize that they have made a mistake and will correct it. An 
equilibrating process in the direction of the 'natural rate' equilibrium will be set into motion. It 
does not mean that this equilibrium will be reached, because of the fact that the incorrect 
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adaptation of the individuals' production will involve propagation mechanisms. These mecha-
nisms incorporate, for instance, the effects of an expansion of the productive capacity. As Lucas 
does not consider the structure of production, like Hayek did, the disturbanee of the productive 
capacity of an economy may only be in size. Lucas's business cycle theory is a monetary 
overinvestment theory. It does not account for distortions of the structure of production because 
these distortions can only be explained in terms of the inconsistency of individual plans. 
However, plans may only be inconsistent if several individuals exist. By introducing the 
'representative individual' Lucas abstracts from the coordination problem, and therefore from 
analyzing distortions of the structure of production, because by definition only one such a 
'representative individual' exists. Plans cannot be interpersonally inconsistent because there is 
only one individual and one plan. 
3.8. Criticisms 
Several points of criticisms have been brought in against Lucas's analysis. These concern (1) the 
model used, (2) the REH, (3) the informational assumptions, and (4) the modelling strategy. 
Firstly, Lucas presupposes an objective reality which is described correctly by his model. 
Changing actions of individuals do not change the structure of his model (B. Friedman (1979, p. 
38)). In other words, Lucas assumes that objective reality is independent of the individuals' 
actions. 
Secondly, the strong form of the REH holds that expectations are correct. The micro-REH 
assumes that individual expectations are correct. This means that individuals must have perfect 
knowledge and perfect foresight, which will only be true if information may be obtained costless. 
Correct aggregate expectations will only yield an equivalent equilibrium to correct individual 
expectations if we disregard from interactions between the actions of individuals. Lucas achieves 
such equivalence by adopting a particular modelling strategy, namely the 'representative 
individual'. Another criticism which has been brought forward against the REH is that the fact 
that systematic expectational errors are easily correctable does not mean that such errors are 
successfully avoided (Hahn (1986, p. 281)). 
Fourthly, by modelling the economy in terms of 'representative individuals' Lucas is unable to 
incorporate an analysis of the coordination problem (Frydman en Phelps, 1983, p. 14). By 
disregarding the distinction between individual and general equilibrium Lucas assumes that the 
economy as a whole will be most efficiënt (optimal) if all individuals optimally adapt their 
actions (Butos, 1986, p. 334). This means that the instability of any model which does incorpora-
te this problem is eliminated. As Buiter (1980, p. 46) noted, Lucas models the individual's 
actions as a game against nature, instead of a game against other optimizing players. This 
modelling strategy is misleading in the sense that "[o]nce we cease to model private agents as 
playing a game against nature - the competitive market - Standard optimisation techniques are 
Cf. Lucas and Sargent (1978, pp. 312 - 14) and Fischer (1980). 
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no longer applicable within the private sector" (Buiter, 1980, p. 46, italics in original). Lucas may 
then not obtain the same results as he does now. Perhaps he would not obtain any determinate 
results at all. In other words, although this modelling strategy seems rather convenient, it may 
be extremely misleading. A related point to the use of the representative individual as a 
modelling strategy is the fact that it implies that the analysis of distributional effects is excluded. 
Implicitly Lucas assumes that distributional effects are not important. However, these effects may 
lead to changes in actions, even though the aggregates remain the same. These changes may 
alter the structure of the economy (Snippe, 1985). Lucas does away with this problem by 
assuming a representative agent and a 'true and objective' reality. 
4. The di£ferences between Hayek's and Lucas's analyses 
Both Hayek and Lucas develop an analysis which shows some similarities. Both argue that 
business cycle theory must start from general equilibrium analysis. But whereas Hayek defmes 
general equilibrium as a situation in which all individuals hold perfect knowledge and perfect 
foresight, Lucas defines two equilibrium constructs, only one of which implies the knowledge 
requirements as defined by Hayek (namely the 'natural rate' equilibrium). The other construct, 
the Rational Expectations Equilibrium, is consistent with imperfect information. Individuals may 
make mistakes, but the changes in their actions are optimal. The REE is an intertemporal 
equilibrium, just like the Hayekian equilibrium. But the latter implies that the actions of the 
individuals are correct, whereas the REE only holds that the changes in these actions are. 
Scheide (1986, p. 578) concludes that the differences in the Hayekian and New Classical 
equilibrium constructs are only semantical in nature. This conclusion seems to be false in the 
sense that there is a more fundamental difference between the two equilibria. Already in 1928 
Hayek focuses attention on the coordination problem. His definition of equilibrium explicitly 
claims that this problem must be solved. This implies that Hayek cannot restrict his analysis to 
the 'pure logic of choice': he must indicate the conditions which may lead to the solution of the 
coordination problem. He depicts these conditions as those in which the subjective data will tend 
to be identical to the objective data (i.e. objective reality). These conditions will incorporate the 
individual's expectations. These need not be correct, although they are formed rationally. This 
leads O'Driscoll (1979, p. 167) and Scheide (1986, p. 581) to conclude that Hayek's expectations 
formation hypothesis is identical to the weak form of the REH. Lucas, on the other hand, 
adopts the strong form of the REH. This difference is caused by his interpretation of economics 
as analyzing recurrent actions (Lucas (1977, p. 224)). It implies that in the social events studied 
by business cycle theory, there is no need (or, rather, that it is wrong) to incorporate 'Knight-
ean' uncertainty (Knight, 1921, pp. 19 - 20). If such uncertainty is absent, one can describe the 
economy in terms of probability distributions. Lucas's rational (correct) expectations are the 
mathematical means of these distributions. Hayek on the other hand allows for uncertainty. Then 
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human knowledge and expectations are unpredictable. The 'outside observer' cannot determine 
whether an individual's expectations are correct. This may only become clear after the individual 
has acted. 
By assuming an objective reality Hayek does not account for the fact that the objective reality 
depends on the subjective perceptions and, therefore, on the subjective data. If the coordination 
problem exists, individuals will change their actions. This will change the objective reality, which 
hampers the movement of the subjective data in the direction of the objective data. Lucas 
circumvents this problem by adopting a 'representative-agent' model. In such a model coordina-
tion problems cannot arise because of the fact that there is only one individual (or because all 
individuals are identical). Lucas also presupposes an objective reality which is independent of the 
perceptions of the individuals. This enables him to interpret the problem which individuals are 
facing as an optimizing game against nature instead of a game between optimizing players. By 
adhering to the strong form of the REH (that is by assuming correct expectations), this game is 
played optimally in the sense that individuals do not make systematic expectational errors. 
However, cyclical phenomena must be explained either by systematic errors or by propagation 
mechanisms. Lucas chooses the latter. Unfortunately, he does not incorporate them into his 
formal analysis (although in principle such incorporation does seem feasible). 
The emphasis on the coordination of individual plans, and the subsequent desaggregated analysis, 
enables Hayek to pay attention to the nonneutrality of credit expansion and to the resulting 
distortions in the structure of production. Lucas, on the other hand, uses a highly aggregated 
form of analysis, which makes it inevitable for him to concentrate on the magnitude of the 
aggregated variables. In other words, Hayek is able to study distributional effects, whereas Lucas 
must confïne his analysis to the magnitude of the aggregates in his model. This may best be 
illustrated by saying that Hayek's business cycle theory is a monetary malinvestment theory 
whereas that of Lucas is a monetary overinvestment theory. 
The final difference which may be derived from the above analysis is that Hayek and Lucas 
differ in their choice of transmission mechanism. Whereas Hayek considers the rate of interest 
to play a fundamental role during the cycle, Lucas (1977, p. 237 note 15) rejects this trans-
mission mechanism on empirical grounds. 
5. The differences explained 
The differences stated above can be explained by reference to the goals Hayek and Lucas 
respectively ascribe to economics as a science. Hayek (1964, pp. 91 - 92) stated that "... the task 
of economie theory was to explain how an overall order of economie activity was achieved which 
utilizes a large amount of knowledge which was not concentrated in any one mind but existed as 
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the separate knowledge of thousand or millions of different individuals." Such explanation 
involves two elements, as Lachmann (1973, p. 204) has shown. Firstly, economie activity must be 
interpreted in terms of individual plans which are goal-directed. This methodological individualist 
position is one of the main tenets of 'Austrianism'. In the Hayekian view, economics must make 
the world around us intelligible in terms of human action and individual plans on which these 
actions are based. These plans may be fulfilled, leading to intended and expected consequences 
of the actions. But they may also fail, which means that the results are unexpected. One of the 
main reasons Hayek discerns for this unexpectedness is the fact that individuals do not possess 
perfect knowledge and perfect foresight. More specifically, they are faced with 'Knightean' 
uncertainty. They will make expectational errors. However, this does not imply that individuals 
do not act rationally. Given their knowledge, individuals will always act to the best of their 
abilities. In this sense human action is always rational. In contrast, the economy as a whole need 
not perform (Pareto-)optimally, because individual plans may not be interpersonally consistent. 
In other words, the coordination problem may prohibit the simultaneous achievement of 
individual and general equilibrium. It is this problem which forms the focus of Hayek's analysis. 
As he indicated in his 1937-article, the empirical content of economics is constituted by 
propositions concerning the learning process of individuals (Hayek (1937, p. 33)). In other words, 
the question is whether a tendency towards general equilibrium exists. It means that Hayek tries 
to establish whether there is a tendency towards the solution of the coordination problem. 
In contrast, Lucas's analysis does not allow for a multitude of individuals and their plans. His 
representative-individual models are not designed for the purpose Hayek ascribed to economie 
theory. Instead, Lucas (1981, p. 271; 1988, p. 35) holds that economists as 'technicians' must 
develop models which aim at correct predictions in order to be useful for policy prescriptions. 
Therefore, Lucas's models aim for descriptive simplicity and not for descriptive completeness. 
Their aim is to predict as correctly as possible. In this sense Lucas may be called an instrumen-
talist a la Friedman. The simplicity is achieved by introducing 'representative individuals'. 
However, this introduction limits the problems to be analyzed; it does not allow for the analysis 
of the coordination problem because 'representative-individuals' models cannot differentiate 
between optimality for the individual and for the economy as a whole. 
The differences between Hayek's economie analysis and that of Lucas may now be explained in 
terms of the different goals both economists pursue. Firstly, Hayek cannot assume that general 
equilibrium is already attained because this would beg his question if and how such equilibrium 
would come about (that is, if and how the coordination problem will be solved). Lucas, on the 
other hand, is not interested in the coordination problem. Therefore, he can assume it away by 
introducing the 'representative-individual' concept as a modelling device. This device circumvents 
the 'Cournot problem', thereby allowing for predictions. 
Secondly, Hayek tries to explain why there should be a tendency towards general equilibrium 
when agents have imperfect knowledge and imperfect foresight. He is not interested in 
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predicting individual actions. Because of this he may incorporate 'Knightean' uncertainty (as this 
type of uncertainty implies the unknowability of the future). By contrast, Lucas tries to construct 
models in order to predict. Descriptive completeness and 'realism' are then not needed; all 
Lucas must do (and does) is to construct models which are as simple as possible and which 
predict as accurately as possible. Therefore, Lucas's assumptions with regard to the expectations 
formation process and the coordination problem seem consistent with the goal he tries to 
achieve. The strong form of the REH and the absence of the coordination problem both amount 
to a simplification of the analysis. They imply that individuals know the correct structure of the 
economy, thereby allowing for predictions because 'Knightean' uncertainty is eliminated. 
Thirdly, the emphasis on the coordination problem implies that Hayek must analyze the 
structure of the economy. It is not sufficiënt to concentrate on aggregates and index numbers, 
because they disguise whether plans are not coordinated. This leads Hayek to adopt a monetary 
malinvestment theory of the business cycle. As was already discussed, Lucas simplifies his 
analysis by introducing 'representative individuals'. This prohibits the analysis of the structure of 
production. Therefore, Lucas's business cycle theory may best be labelled a monetary overinvest-
ment theory. 
Finally, while Hayek accepted the real rate of interest as the transmission mechanism during 
business cycles, Lucas rejected it. This rejection was founded on empirical grounds. This makes 
it impossible as well as unnecessary to explain this difference by referring to differences with 
regard to the goals both authors try to achieve. 
6. Conclusion 
Butos (1986) concluded that Lucas's claim on the continuation of Hayek's work on business 
cycle theory is correct though misleading. This conclusion seems to be justified with regard to 
such issues as the nature of uncertainty and the role played by the knowledge of individuals. 
Furthermore, Lucas neglects the differences regarding the problem both authors analyze: the 
coordination problem versus the 'pure logic of choice'. This difference enabled Hayek to 
concentrate on the distortion of the structure of production, whereas Lucas limits his analysis to 
the magnitude of aggregated variables. As Butos (1988, p. 337) argues, "... new-classical 
economists limit their conceptualization by the techniques available, while for Hayek the 
conceptualization of a problem points to the limitations of the available techniques." Unfortu-
nately, Butos does not indicate why this is so. The analysis in this paper has tried to remedy this 
gap by studying the goals both authors think economics must try to achieve. Hayek's attention to 
the coordination problem was seen to follow from his view on the purpose of economics as a 
science. In his view economics had to explain reality in terms of individual plans. Moreover, it 
had to indicate whether there is a tendency towards the solution of the coordination problem. 
This problem implies a multitude of interpersonally inconsistent plans, which cannot be known 
by the scientist. This rendered prediction of individual behaviour impossible. By contrast, Lucas 
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is interested in predicting human behaviour, or rather economie activity. Therefore, he must 
simplify his analysis in order to circumvent the 'Cournot problem'. Furthermore, it allowed him 
to assume the coordination problem solved by introducing the 'representative-individual' concept 
as a modelling device. 
In conclusion, Lucas cannot be said to elaborate on Hayek's work because both economists try 
to reach different goals. Whereas Hayek wanted to explain reality in terms of a multitude of 
individual plans which would presumably be interpersonally inconsistent, Lucas aims at predicting 
'representative-individual' behaviour. This difference leads to the analytical differences discussed. 
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